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I. INTRODUCTION
As the unemployment rate reaches its highest level in almost six
years,1 the U.S. economy is currently at an all time low. The economy's
demise is due to a variety of factors, including a $90 million trade deficit
in 1990 that was sparked by skyrocketing consumer demand for foreign
products during the 1980's.2 This demand created more jobs for our
competitors abroad. A similar increase in U.S. exports could help stimu-
late employment at home.
Small companies have traditionally relied on domestic markets for
their bread and butter, leaving big business to play the major role in pro-
moting U.S. exports. Today, however, the small business sector has a
significant role to play in the promotion of U.S. exports. In 1988, small
* B.S., Georgetown University School of Foreign Service; Juris Doctor, Georgetown University;
former Attorney Advisor, Export-Import Bank of the United States, Dill International Research
Fellow and Assistant Professor of Law, Babson College. The author wishes to thank the Babson
College Board of Research for its support.
1 Robert D. Hershey, Jr., U.S. Unemployment Increases To Z1%, Worst In 5 1/2 Years, New
York Times, Jan. 11, 1992 at 1.




companies employed 54% of the work force,3 but less than half of those
companies exported their products.4 Thus, as the recession cuts into the
buying power of most Americans, the health of the U.S. economy rests in
part on the extent to which the small-business community can success-
fully market its products to foreign customers.
One of the most significant reasons why small companies are reluc-
tant to export is their lack of access to adequate financing.5 Commercial
banks have historically either refused to finance small business exports
altogether or made the costs of financing those exports restrictive. In the
1980's, however, a strong small-business lobby convinced Congress to
enact legislation which provided incentives for commercial banks to fi-
nance small-business exports. The Small Business Expansion Act of
1980 required that the U.S. Small Business Administration ("SBA")
guarantee commercial bank loans to small-business exporters. 6 Two
years later, Congress also mandated that the Export-Import Bank of the
U.S. ("Eximbank") establish a program to guarantee private sector loans
to small exporters.7 In 1990, the total amounts authorized under the
Eximbank and SBA programs were $88.6 million' and $5 million,9
respectively.
The 1980's legislation was ground-breaking because it required both
agencies to adopt programs that fell outside of their traditional areas of
expertise. The SBA, longstanding protector of small business interests
on the domestic front, was required to finance the international activities
of small companies. Eximbank, the government's chief export financing
agency for almost 60 years, was told that it had to change its practice of
supporting only large exporters and start targeting small exporters as
well. While the motives of Congress in passing this legislation may have
been noble, the law eventually gave birth to a series of overlapping gov-
3 Small Business Obstacles to Exporting: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Exports, Tourism
and Special Problems of the House Comm. on Small Business, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 37 (1988)
[hereinafter "Obstacles to Export Hearings"] (statement of Stanley Parrish, Assoc. Director, SBA).
4 Id. at 33 (statement of Michael Czinkota, Deputy Assoc. Assist. Secretary, U.S. Dept. of
Commerce).
5 Charles E. Mahone, Jr., Factors That Restrict Exports Of Small And Medium-Sized Firms:
The Role Of Export Financing, 2 Journal Of Small Business Strategy 24 (Nov. 1991).
6 The Small Business Export Expansion Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2321, 2323
(1980) (current version at 15 U.S.C.A. See. 636(a)(14)(A)(1991).
7 The Export Trading Company Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1239 (1982) (current
version in the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended, 12 U.S.C.A. Sec. 635a-4 (1991).
8 Export-Import Bank of the United States, 1990 Annual Report, 13 (1990) [hereinafter "1990
Annual Report"].
9 Export Related Financings From FY79 to FY90 2 (Aug. 1990) [hereinafter "SBA
Financings"].
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ernment regulations administered by two different agencies who now
compete for the same clientele.
In light of the above, two questions need to be asked: First, do both
of these programs effectively meet the needs of small business exporters?
Second, since the programs appear redundant, wouldn't one program ad-
ministered by a single agency promote both lower costs and greater
overall government efficiency?
This paper will attempt to address these questions by examining the
legislation and subsequent regulations that lead to the establishment of
the SBA and Eximbank guarantee programs. First, there will be a brief
discussion of the types of financing needed by small-business exporters
and the problems they face when they try to get financing. The 1980's
legislation, which attempted to redress some of those problems, as well as
the regulations and guidelines that were adopted by the SBA and Ex-
imbank to implement that legislation, will then be covered. Finally,
based on an evaluation of the above regulations and guidelines, measures
to streamline the two programs will be proposed.
II. FINANCING OBSTACLES FACED BY SMALL BuSINESS EXPORTERS
A. Commercial Bank Export Financing
In the early 1980's, Congress acknowledged that although "small
and medium-sized exporters create most [U.S.] jobs..., [they] face the
greatest obstacles to successfully exporting the goods they produce."10
Some of these obstacles come from within the small-business community
itself. Small companies often are intimidated by unfamiliar foreign cul-
tural and legal differences, 11 and lack sufficient international trade exper-
tise to market their products.12 But as one study of over 350 small
companies showed, access to export financing is one of the most signifi-
cant obstacles to exporting that small businesses face.13
Unless they have the rare luck of getting a foreign client to pay in
cash, small exporters need to have access to several types of commercial
bank financing, including letters of credit, deferred payment purchases,
and direct loans. A letter of credit enables an exporter to look to a bank
10 House Committee On Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, H.R. Rep. No. 290, 97th Cong.,
2nd Sess. 3, reprinted in 1992 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2471.
11 The Small Business Export Expansion Act and the Small Business Export Development Act:
Hearing Before the Senate Select Comm. On Small Business, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 136 (1980) [here-
inafter "Export Expansion Hearings"] (statement of Peter Gould, Deputy Asst. Secretary, U.S.
Dept. of Commerce).
12 Abbas All and Paul Swiercz, Firm Size and Export Behavior: Lessons From the Midwest, 29
Journal of Small Business Management 77 (April 1991).
13 Mahone, supra note 5, at 26.
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for payment instead of to the foreign buyer. The bank in turn takes on
the credit risk associated with the foreign buyer with respect to payment
under the sales contract. This occurs when the bank agrees to pay the
exporter's sales contract price on behalf of the foreign buyer if certain
documents, like bills of lading, are delivered to the bank. 14 An exporter
may want a bank to purchase at a discount the buyer's deferred payment
obligations under the sales contract to the exporter.15 An exporter may
also try to convince a bank to give a buyer a direct loan to be used to
purchase the exporter's products.16
Many banks are reluctant to finance small business exports because
they are skeptical about the payment abilities of foreign buyers. This
skepticism is especially true among small local bankers who usually ser-
vice the small-business sector and have nominal experience in the inter-
national trade area. Bank fears, however, are not wholly without merit.
Lurking beneath the surface of any export finance transaction are poten-
tial restrictions on a buyer's ability to pay, such as political unrest, war,
and restrictive import or exchange rate regulations in the buyer's
country. 17
In fact, because of the risks associated with export finance, many
banks have withdrawn from the export finance field altogether, except
when they provide financing to large, preferred customers - as a favor
to those customers."8 Recent increases in domestic-business bankrupt-
cies and the savings and loan scandal will probably make commercial
banks even more hesitant to lend to small-business exporters.
Small companies also need working-capital financing for their ex-
port transactions. Working capital, or pre-export financing, typically
covers the costs of purchasing raw materials and equipment used to pro-
duce an export.1 9 As one Eximbank official explained, "lack of working
capital financing is one of the biggest barriers small... companies face
14 Ralph H. Folsom, Michael Wallace Gordon and John A. Spanogle, Jr., International Business
Transactions in a Nutshell 47 (1988).
15 Robert Rendell, Export Financing and the Role of the Export-Import Bank of the United
States, 2 J. Int'l L. Econ. 91, 92 (1976).
16 Warren Glick and R. McKinsey, The Export-Import Bank of the United States, 2 Int'l Fin. L.
144 (Robert S. Rendell, 2nd ed. 1983).
17 Id.
18 U.S. Export-Import Bank: On Recapitalization and Other Issues: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on International Finance, Trade and Monetary Policy of the Comm. on Banking Finance and
Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 193 (1988) (citation of Journal of Commerce article entitled
"Lack of Finance Crimps Exports", by Alan S. Cohen).
19 Export-Import Bank of the U.S., Financing and Insuring Exports A User's Guide to Eximbank
and FCIA Programs, 111-1 (1989) [hereinafter "1989 Eximbank User's Guide"].
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when trying to export."' 20 Because working-capital financing is very la-
bor intensive, commercial banks do not believe that the smaller loans
generate enough fees to justify the work involved in processing them.
Banks prefer to deal exclusively with larger transactions because they can
earn higher fees for the same amount of work.21
Banks are also reluctant to finance working-capital loans to small
exporters because the exporters themselves are perceived as being un-
creditworthy. Small exporters who are new to the exporting field and
want to get loans directly from banks to cover production or marketing
costs find banks especially unsympathetic to their needs. Without a
proven international track record, such companies find it virtually im-
possible to get commercial bank loans.
Even if they are able to get working capital loans, small exporters
find the costs associated with those loans very high. Banks sometimes
charge as high as three percent22 for servicing fees and up to three per-
cent over the prime rate for working capital loans.23 Banks also require
that working capital loans be secured by inventory and accounts receiva-
ble and cite the high costs of monitoring these assets as another reason
for the high rates and fees charged for these loans.24
Private sector banks are also generally unwilling to accept foreign
receivables as security for small exporter loans because of the poor credit
risks associated with these receivables. Thus, small exporters will gener-
ally get an unfavorable response from the commercial banking sector,
unless they are wealthy enough to offer personal guarantees or mortgages
on their family homes as security.
B. Government Export Financing
Many governments, including the U.S. government, have financing
programs to help support their countries' exports. Governments may of-
fer low-interest direct loans to foreign buyers, guarantees on commercial-
bank direct loans or letters of credit. Governments may also provide
20 Id.
21 Obstacles To Export Hearings, supra note 3 at 72 (statement of John A. Bohn, Jr., President,
U.S. Export-Import Bank).
22 For example, servicing fees in the amount of $10-415,000 could be charged on a $250,000
working capital loan. See Obstacles That Small Businesses Face In Obtaining Export Financing:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Exports, Tax Policy and Special Problems of the House Comm. On
Small Business, 101st Cong. 1st sess. 85 (1989) [hereinafter "Export Financing Obstacles Hearing"]
12-18 (statement of Norman Sisisky, Chairman).
23 Edward Reed, Richard Cotter, Edward Gill & Richard Smith, Commercial Banking 267
(1980).
24 Id. at 264-65.
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insurance to exporters to cover foreign political or exchange risks.2 5
Government programs essentially subsidize exporters by providing their
foreign buyers with below market rates on direct loans or by offering
guarantees to banks who otherwise would have been unwilling to finance
these transactions. Critics of government export financing programs
thus often say that these programs operate in "such a manner as to con-
travene the basic principles of free and undisturbed world trade."2 6
Proponents of export subsidies, however, believe that "when the pri-
vate sector fails to perform... activities necessary to the proper function
of free markets, the government has a legitimate responsibility to correct
these market failures by intervening"2 7 with appropriate measures. Im-
plicit in this statement is the assumption that commercial banks have
shirked their civic duties by failing to adequately finance U.S. exports.
The U.S. has seen a drastic increase in the use of government export
subsidies by its major trading competitors.28 Distasteful as they may be
to critics, export subsidies probably will remain a fact of life for some
time to come.
C. Eximbank Financing
In response to the increased use of export subsidies by competitors
of the U.S., Congress directed Eximbank to "neutralize the effect of such
foreign credit on international sales competition."2 9 Operating as the
U.S. government's chief export financing agency, the Bank was originally
established in 1945 to help the balance of trade by financing the sale of
U.S. goods to post-World War Two Europe.3" The Bank provides vari-
ous types of export financing, including guarantees to commercial banks,
direct loans to foreign buyers of U.S. exports, export credit insurance
covering foreign receivable risks, and pre-export guarantees. 3 The Bank
now supports a wide variety of export transactions, including construc-
25 Karen Hudes, Protecting Against Incovertabilty and Transfer Risk- An Outline of Trade Fi-
nancing Programs of the Export-Import Bank of the United States, 9 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L.
REV. 463, 464 (Spring 1986).
26 Brock Says Tentative Paris Agreement IsA Start But Not Enough, U.S. Export Weekly (BNA)
No. 379, at 65 (Oct. 20, 1981).
27 Aid and Trade: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On International Finance, Trade and Monetary
Policy of the House Comm On Banking Finance and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong. 2nd Sess. 69 (1988)
(statement of Stuart K. Tucker, Overseas Development Council).
28 Thomas Graham, Sources of Export Financing, 14 GA. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 464 (1984).
29 12 U.S.C.A. Sec. 635(2)(b)(1)(B) (1992).
30 Rendell, supra note 15, at 95.
31 1990 Annual Report, supra note 8, at 2.
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tion projects and aircraft sales.32
Having supported over $200 billion in exports,33 the Bank has been
traditionally viewed as a financing vehicle for large exporters. One small
exporter once scathingly criticized the Bank for providing financing to
only "seven companies [who] received 67 percent of Eximbank's total
funding budget [in one year] ... with just a token amount allocated to
small firms."34
Eximbank's lack of support for the small business sector probably
was based in part on its belief that small businesses were incapable of
directly promoting their own exports. The underlining premise behind
this view was that small companies did not have sufficient resources to
export effectively, whereas large multinationals had "the economies of
scale and international production and marketing organizations required
to compete in the burgeoning mass consumer and advanced technologi-
cal industrial markets around the world".35 Thus, the most that a small
company could do would be to "piggyback" onto large U.S. multina-
tional export transactions on a subcontracting basis.3 6 In the 1980's,
however, Congress became convinced that small companies should be-
come more directly involved in the exporting process.
D. SBA Financing
Unlike Eximbank, the SBA has been devoted to guarding the inter-
ests of small business for almost forty years.37 This was done primarily
through loan and guarantee programs required by law to promote "plant
construction... [and] the acquisition of land, material, supplies, equip-
32 Export-Import Bank of the United States, 1988 Annual Report, 1-9 (1988) [hereinafter "1988
Annual Report"].
33 Id. at 2.
34 E.A. Werling, Eximbank Must Change Course, Enterprise, at 17 (1982).
35 See Lincoln Armstrong, Small Business Overseas Marketing, in THE VrrAL MAJORrrY,
SMALL BUSINESS IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY, ESSAYS MARKING THE TWENTIETH ANNIVER-
SARY OF THE U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINITRATION 373 (Deane Carson, ed. 1973) [hereinafter
The Vital Majority].
36 In the early 1980's, the Bank implicitly acknowledged this philosophy when it provided evi-
dence to Congress that many small exporters had indirectly benefitted from Eximbank loans to large
companies like Boeing and Westinghouse. See Export Promotion Programs of the Foreign Commer-
cial Service and the Export-Import Bank: Hearing Before the House Subcomm Of The Comm. On
Government Operations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1983) [hereinafter "Export Promotion Hearings"]
(statement of James E. Yonge, Director, Eximbank).
37 For a description of the history of the SBA see essay by Anthony Chase, Federal Support of
the Vital Majority: The Development of the U.S. Small Business Administration, in The Vital Major-




ment and working capital ' 38 for small-business transactions. The legisla-
tion made the SBA lead agency on all domestic small business
transactions, but it did not give the SBA a stated role in supporting
small-business' international transactions.
In response to a series of hearings and reports which cited lack of
adequate export financing as one of the most significant barriers to small-
business exporters, Congress concluded that the federal government was
not providing sufficient support for small business exporters and directed
the SBA to provide financial assistance to serve their needs. 9
III. SBA AND EximnANK STATUTORY REVISIONS
As the above indicates, for most of their histories, neither the SBA
nor Eximbank demonstrated a significant commitment to promoting
small-business exports. The 1980's legislation sought to remedy this
situation.
A. SBA Legislation
Congressional hearings on the state of small business exports in
1980 prompted extensive input from both government and private sector
experts. The hearings were held to consider the creation of an SBA Of-
fice of International Trade and an SBA program to guarantee pre-export
loans to small businesses. There was some criticism that an International
Trade Office established to provide international-marketing information
to small companies would unnecessarily duplicate the same informa-
tional services already provided by the U.S. Commerce Department.'
However, the response to the proposed pre-export guarantee program
was uniformly favorable.
One leading state government official praised the proposed pro-
gram,41 and the U.S. Secretary of Commerce for Trade and Development
said that the program would help solve the small-business credit predica-
ment.42 Officials from the commercial-banking industry also voiced their
38 The Small Business Act, Pub. Law no. 85-536, 72 Stat. 384 (1958) (current version at 15
U.S.C. Sec. 636(a) (1992).
39 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 11 l(a)(1),(6), and (b)(3).
40 Small Business Export Expansion Act" Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Finance of the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong. 2nd Sess. 94 (1980) [hereinafter "Small
Business Export Hearings"] (statement of Herta Lande Seidman, Asst. Secretary, U.S. Dept. of
Commerce).
41 Export Expansion Hearings, supra note 11 at 75 (statement of Stanley S. Newman, Deputy
Commissioner, New York Dept. of Commerce).
42 Small Business Export Hearings, supra note 40, at 94.
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support for the proposed guarantee program.43 In response to the rec-
ommendations made at the hearings, Congress mandated that the SBA
provide guarantees for both domestic transactions and "revolving lines of
credit for export purposes... to enable small business concerns... to
develop foreign markets and for pre-export financing: [Provided, however,
that] no extension or revolving line... [could] be for a period... exceed-
ing 3 years". [emphasis added]'
With respect to the new pre-export program, Congress let stand sev-
eral important statutory requirements that related to domestic SBA loans
and guarantees. For instance, the SBA was only allowed to guarantee
that part of commercial-bank interest rates which did "not exceed the
current average market yield on outstanding marketable obligations of
the United States"'4 with similar maturities. Second, the SBA could
only finance pre-export guarantees "of such sound value or so secured as
reasonably to assure repayment"." Finally, SBA guarantees could only
cover up to eighty five percent of small export loans for up to $750,000. 47
B. Eximbank Legislation
Two years after the enactment of the SBA legislation, Congress
mandated that Eximbank also establish a new program to help exporters
obtain commercial-bank pre-export financing. Specifically, the law pro-
vided that Eximbank guarantee commercial bank pre-export loans to ex-
porters "when such loans are secured by export accounts receivable or
inventories of exportable goods."' 4 In 1983, Congress expanded Ex-
imbank's list of acceptable collateral requirements to include "accounts
receivable from leases, performance contracts, grant commitments, par-
ticipation fees, member dues, revenue from publications, or such other
collateral as the Board of Directors may deem appropriate."4 9
C. Inherent Conflicts In SBA and Eximbank Legislation
Both the SBA and Eximbank are "today faced with two major
43 Export Expansion Hearings, supra note 11, at 169 (statement of Alfred Daiboch, Asst. Presi-
dent, Banker's Trust).
44 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 636(a)(14)(A) (1992). Congress also passed legislation requiring the SBA to
create a loan guarantee program to help small companies who are adversely affected by import
competition. This program will not be discussed in this article.
45 15 U.S.C. See. 636(a)(4) (1992).
46 Id. at Sec. 636(a)(6).
47 Id. at See. 636(a)(20)(B)(i) and (ii).
48 12 U.S.C.A. Sec. 635a-4 (1989).
49 The Export-Import Bank Act Amendments of 1983, Pub. Law no. 98-181, 97 Stat. 1157
(1983) (current version at 12 U.S.C.A. Sec. 635a-4 (1991).
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forces [which are pulling them] ... in opposite directions... : the budget
deficit and the trade deficit."5 On one hand, they must reduce the trade
deficit by supporting U.S. exports. On the other hand, they run the risk
of contributing to the budget deficit if they incur losses as a result of
guaranteeing uncreditworthy exporters.
The law indirectly demands that the SBA take into account budget
deficit issues by providing that all SBA transactions must be "of such
sound value or so secured as reasonably to assure repayment".51 Simi-
larly, Eximbank must make sure that its loans have "a reasonable assur-
ance of repayment."52 Furthermore, the Export Trading Company Act
directs Eximbank to provide guarantees only when commercial banks are
not willing to provide financing to "otherwise creditworthy [emphasis ad-
ded]..., exporters."53 However, since the types of transactions financed
under both programs do not offer a reasonable assurance of repayment
from a strictly commercial perspective, there is a good chance that both
agencies will incur losses as a result of payment defaults.
In 1983, Congress further clouded the repayment issue for Ex-
imbank. That year, legislation was passed which directed the Bank to
approve guarantees "on terms and conditions which are fully competitive
with the Government supported rates and terms.., from principal coun-
tries whose exporters compete with United States exporters."' 54 This pro-
vision was intended to apply to competitive bidding situations in which
foreign export credit agencies were providing financing to un-
creditworthy exporters. In order to support the U.S. exporter in such
instances, Congress urged the Bank to "re-examine the creditworthi-
ness" 55 of the U.S. exporter, presumably by applying more liberal credit
50 Stephan M. Minikes, U.S. Government Role In Financing And Promoting International Con-
struction Projects, International Construction Law Seminar Materials, A.B.A. Forum Comm. On
The Construction Industry, 23 (1985).
51 15 U.S.C.A. See. 636(a)(6) (1992). Congress was obviously concerned about potential losses
under the ERLC Program, since it suggested during the Small Business Expansion Act's delibera-
tions that the SBA "take affirmative steps to moderate the agency's default rate." See House Small
Business Comm., H.R. Report No. 96-1434, 126 Cong. Record (1980).
52 12 U.S.C.A. See. 635(b)(1)(B) (1989) provides that Eximbank "loans ... shall.., offer rea-
sonable assurance of repayment." While this provision doesn't specifically mention the term "guar-
antees", it presumably should serve as a guide for all Bank credit decisions. This assumption is
supported by a statement made by former Bank President, James E. Yonge, who told Congress that
in making credit decisions under the WCG Program, Eximbank looked "to the domestic exporter
for [its] ... required 'reasonable assurance of repayment'." See Export Promotion Hearings, supra
note 36, at 50.
53 12 U.S.C.A. Sec. 635-a(l) (1989).
54 12 U.S.C. § 635(b)(1)(A) (1989).
5 House Comm. On Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, H.R. Report No. 98-176, 98th Cong.
Ist Sess. 7 (May 16, 1983).
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evaluation criteria. Many small companies, however, feel that Eximbank
has ignored this mandate by continuing to demand the same type of pro-
hibitive requirements that made pre-export financing inaccessible to them
in the first place.
Another issue which exacerbates the budget deficit issue for Ex-
imbank is the fact that the Bank has operated at a large loss for the last
several years.56 This is because the Federal Financing Bank, which loans
Eximbank money to finance its loans, currently charges Eximbank rates
that are higher than the rates that Eximbank in turn charges its own
borrowers. As Eximbank's 1990 annual report admits, "absent the
elimination of this deficiency, through the attainment of profitable opera-
tions... Eximbank may ultimately be unable to repay its current debt
"58
How can either agency resolve the budget deficit problem? One al-
ternative is to approve a large number of transactions and offset potential
losses by requiring additional security and charging higher front-end
fees. Another alternative would be to finance only loans that are deemed
viable from a strictly commercial perspective. While these alternatives
might satisfy budget deficit concerns, they would not please the small
business community. Indeed, both the SBA and Eximbank have been
criticized for either refusing to finance exports because they worry too
much about potential losses59 or demanding unreasonably burdensome
security requirements for their guarantees.6' Specific security require-
ments under the Eximbank Working Capital Gains ("WCG") Program
will be discussed below.
IV. PROGRAM REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES
Eximbank implemented the revisions to its enabling statute by sim-
ply issuing guidelines that it updates from time to time,6 1 but it never
adopted any formal regulations. The SBA, however, did adopt regula-
tions that established the Export Revolving Line of Credit ("ERLC")
Program" and published proposed guidelines63 that attempted to clarify
56 1990 Annual Report, supra note 8, at 40.
57 1988 Annual Report, supra note 32, at 33,34.
58 Id.
59 Graham, supra note 28, at 465.
60 Export Financing Obstacles Hearing, supra note 22 at 85 (position paper on Export Finance
submitted by the Industry Sector Advisory Comm. on Small and Minority Business for Trade Policy
Matters).
61 1989 Eximbank User's Guide, supra note 19.
62 13 C.F.R. Sec. 122.54-1 to 6 (1992).
63 U.S. Small Business Administration Draft Export Revolving Line of Credit User's Guide
(March 1991) [hereinafter "SBA User's Guide"]. The proposed SBA guidelines appear to try to
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certain issues left unanswered by the ERLC Program regulations.
The proposed SBA guidelines also tried to respond to recommenda-
tions made by a consultant hired by the agency to evaluate the ERLC
Program in 1989.4 The evaluation was based on interviews with com-
mercial banks, exporters and SBA staff. The consultant concluded,
among other things, that the SBA's staff lacked sufficient expertise to
process international transactions and that program documentary re-
quirements were too complicated.65
A detailed description and comparison of the types of transactions
covered, eligibility and collateral requirements, repayment terms, fees
charged and guaranteed interest rates under both programs will be cov-
ered below.
A. Types of Transactions Covered
The SBA regulations provide that the SBA will guarantee commer-
cial bank loans if those loans are used to "develop a foreign market and/
or finance labor and materials for pre-export production."66 Similarly,
Eximbank guidelines state that Eximbank will issue guarantees to cover
commercial bank loans used (1) to purchase materials or services used to
produce exports or (2) to market products "or conduct other promo-
tional activities aimed at developing new overseas business."'6 7 "Other
promotional activities" presumably includes the costs of hiring foreign
consultants.
B. Exporter Eligibility
Some small companies may find Eximbank's eligibility requirements
intimidating. Former Eximbank Chairman William Draper once said
that only exporters who had "management with the skills and experience
necessary to make the venture a success"68 would be considered eligible
for coverage. However, Bank guidelines originally did little to clarify
what actual criteria the Bank used to determine if a company had the
mirror Eximbank's WCG Program as much as possible. The SBA even calls its proposed guidelines
a "User's Guide". This is the same name that Eximbank uses for its guidelines. The SBA is cur-
rently soliciting comments about its proposed guidelines from the public.
64 See Irving Burton Associates, Draft Review of the Export Revolving Line of Credit Program
Prepared for the Small Business Administration (September 1989) [hereinafter "ERLC Review"].
65 Id. at 22.
66 13 C.F.R. Sec. 122.54-3 (1992).
67 Export-Import Bank of the U.S., Financing and Insuring ExportsA User's Guide to Eximbank
and FCIA Programs, 111-2 (July 1990) [hereinafter "1990 Eximbank User's Guide"].
68 William H. Draper III, President and Chairman of the Export-Import Bank of the United
States, Prepared Statement Before the House Subcomm. On Int'l Econ. Policy and Trade, 2 (Aug.
1984).
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requisite skills and experience. The guidelines, which simply stated that
an eligible exporter was a company that had "exporting potential",6 9
have been revised recently to clarify this situation. They now state that
exporters need to have a "positive new worth and experience in the field
... [and] principals or senior management are expected to have at least
two years of cumulative export experience."70 Eximbank also requires
that exporters submit financial statements which cover the past three
years,71 thus implying that applicants must have at least three years of
general business experience to be eligible.
Furthermore, in a case study used by Eximbank during training ses-
sions, a model exporter is described as one who has international experi-
ence, significant technical experience and graduate level educational
credentials. The case study applicant's international experience consists
of its having piggybacked onto large firm international sales transactions.
The skills of the applicant's management team were obtained in MBA
programs at nationally known universities, and the exporter's technical
consultant had 35 years of experience.72
The SBA is more liberal than Eximbank with respect to exporter
eligibility requirements. SBA regulations simply state that exporters are
eligible for SBA financing if they have been in business for at least one
year.73 This one year requirement may be waived if the SBA determines
that the exporter has more extensive international trade experience.
C. Lender Eligibility
The SBA regulations and proposed guidelines are silent about lender
eligibility requirements. Eximbank guidelines, however, state that com-
mercial banks must have some business loan experience, such as collec-
tion and U.C.C. filings, to be eligible for a guarantee.7 4
In addition to offering guarantees to commercial banks, the law di-
rects Eximbank to make arrangements to guarantee state and municipal
agencies who finance local exports.75 To date, the Bank has made such
agreements with the City of Los Angeles, the Port Authority of New
69 1989 Eximbank User's Guide, supra note 19, at III-1.
70 1990 Eximbank User's Guide, supra note 67, at 111-7.
71 Id. at 111-5.
72 Export-Import Bank of the U.S.: Case Study for Working Capital Guarantee Program, 1
(undated).
73 13 C.F.R. Sec. 122.54-(2)(a) (1992).
74 1990 Eximbank User's Guide, supra note 67, at 111-2.
75 The law requires Eximbank to allocate some of its small business financings to guarantees of
state export finance agency loans to exporters. See 12 U.S.C.A. Sec. 635(b)(1)(E)(vii)(1) (1989).
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York, and the states of Maryland, Michigan and Oklahoma.76
D. Repayment Terms
Repayment terms under the ERLC Program must be no longer than
eighteen months. However, the law implies that the terms can be ex-
tended for an additional eighteen month period since the statute sets the
overall loan term at three years.77
Eximbank will cover loans for up to the earlier of six months from
the date of the last disbursement under the loan or six months from the
last date in the disbursement period. 78 Eximbank considers a request for
a loan renewal as if it were a new application, but the guidelines are not
clear on how long the renewal term can last.
E. Guaranteed Loan Amounts
Eximbank guidelines state that the lender can only lend ninety per-
cent of the collateral value. Thus, there are theoretically no set limits on
the Eximbank guarateed loan amount.79 Since the Bank is supposed to
encourage, but not replace the private sector," the Bank also stipulates
that it will only guarantee ninety percent of the commercial bank loan.81
The SBA guarantees eighty five percent of the commercial loan up to
$750,000.82
F. Guaranteed Interest
In addition to paying the fees discussed above, the SBA regulations
state that commercial banks cannot charge interest rates on pre-export
loans that are higher than two and one-quarter over the New York prime
rate.83 This fulfills the statutory requirement that the rates charged on
SBA guaranteed loans must be reasonable and legal.84 Since the regula-
tions and proposed guidelines are silent about guaranteed interest cover-
age, it can be assumed that the SBA will guarantee interest up to two and
one-quarter over the prime rate.
In contrast to the SBA, Eximbank clearly states that it will guaran-
tee "the rate of interest provided in the loan agreement or one percent
76 Eximbank Fact Shee4" City/State Program, 1-5 (Oct. 1990).
77 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 636(a)(14)(A) (1992).
78 1990 Eximbank User's Guide, supra note 67, at 111-6.
79 1990 Eximbank User's Guide, supra note 67, at 111-2.
80 Minikes, supra note 50 at 19.
81 1990 Eximbank User's Guide, supra note 67, at 111-4.
82 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 636(a)(20)(B)(i) and (ii) (1992).
83 13 C.F.R. See. 122.8-4(d).
84 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 636(a)(14)(A) (1990).
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over the U.S. Treasury borrowing rate for borrowings having the same
maturities, whichever is lower."85 Eximbank also places no limits on the
amount of interest that commercial banks may charge exporters for guar-
anteed loans.86 Thus, exporters may still be forced to pay unreasonably
high commercial bank fees and interest rates under the WCG Program
even though their loans are now guaranteed by the government.
G. Collateral Requirements
The collateral requirements under the ERLC and WCG Programs
have received a great deal of criticism from both commercial banks and
exporters. Eximbank requires that commercial banks share on a ninety-
ten first lien basis any security obtained by the bank for the pre-export
loans.8 7 Some financial institutions have criticized Eximbank's first lien
policy because they believe that it unfairly forces them to subordinate
their positions on the guaranteed loans.8 The SBA also expects to share
the collateral with its guaranteed banks on a first lien basis.8 9
In addition to the above collateral requirements, Eximbank asks for
personal guarantees when the exporter is a closely held company." The
SBA also requires that its guarantees be secured by the personal guaran-
tees of company principals. 9 1 However, small business exporters object
to these personal guarantee requirements because they believe that they
should not be made personally liable for purely business transactions. As
the president of one small exporter complained, the small exporter is
forced to "risk his primary capital base to satisfy government lender(s)
obviously skeptical of their own export promotion mission.., an over-
valued dollar or an unexpected serious illness... triggers a liquidation of
all he owns by a government with everything to gain and nothing to
lose".92The criticism against the level of collateral coverage required
under both programs, however, is somewhat misguided. The law de-
mands that the SBA and Eximbank keep their losses at a minimum, and
the only way to ensure that this will occur is to require sufficient security.
With respect to foreign receivables, the law specifically allows Ex-
85 1990 Eximbank User's Guide, supra note 67, at 111-4.
86 Id. at 111-7.
87 1990 Eximbank User's Guide, supra note 67, at 111-2.
88 Export-Import Bank of the United States 1989 State/City Initiative Pilot Projects - Final
Report, 31 (March 1988) [hereinafter "Pilot Projects"].
89 See Small Business Administration Sample Authorizations and Loan Agreement for Guaranty
Loans (Form EX-1565A-GL-1238) 3 (undated).
90 1990 Eximbank User's Guide, supra note 67, at 111-7.
91 13 C.F.R. Sec. 120.103-2 (1985).
92 Export Financing Obstacles Hearing, supra note 22, at 72 (statement of Ervin Ailmen, Presi-
dent, W.C. Smith, Inc.).
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imbank to accept foreign receivables as collateral. Eximbank guidelines
state that this does not include receivables that are sixty days past due,
unless they are secured by Foreign Credit Insurance Association
("FCIA") insurance or irrevocable letters of credit.
93
The SBA regulations, however, are not as clear about foreign receiv-
ables. They state that the SBA will only accept collateral that is "located
within the U.S., its territories and possessions". 94 A conservative inter-
pretation of this provision could cause the SBA's staff to refuse to accept
any foreign receivables. This could have a disastrous effect on new small
exporters, since foreign receivables are the very backbone of pre-export
finance. The proposed SBA guidelines now take a slightly more flexible
approach to the receivable issue by allowing banks to accept foreign re-
ceivables under certain circumstances.95
The proposed SBA guidelines would make a distinction between (1)
foreign receivables that are payable through letters of credit issued in
developing countries and (2) receivables from developing countries that
are payable through letters of credit confirmed by a U.S. bank. The SBA
will not accept the former as collateral unless they have FCIA insurance
coverage. It will accept the latter without any insurance.96 The insur-
ance requirement could pose problems for small exporters since this adds
yet another cost to an already expensive financing package.
H. Program Fees
The SBA charges several different types of fees to use the ERLC
Program, including guaranty fees, commitment fees and guaranty re-
newal fees. Commercial banks are charged a one-quarter of one-percent
up front guaranty fee for loans with maturities of less than one year and a
two-percent fee for maturities of more than one year.97 These fees are
often passed on by the lender to the exporter. The SBA also charges the
exporter a commitment fee which wil be the higher of one-quarter of one
percent or $200.98
Although the law allows the repayment period on guaranteed loans
to cover up to eighteen months, the SBA regulations are silent when it
93 1990 Eximbank User's Guide, supra note 67, at I1-3. The Foreign Credit Insurance Associa-
tion is an arrangement between a group of private insurance companies and Eximbank to provide
insurance to U.S exporters and commercial banks to cover political and commercial risks. See
Hudes, supra note 25, at 463.
94 13. C.F.R. Sec. 122.54-5 (1989).
95 SBA User's Guide, supra note 63, at 6.
96 Id.
97 13. C.F.R. See. 120.104-1(a) (1985).
98 Id. at See. 120.104-2(c).
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comes to describing what fees, if any, would be charged to exporters who
wish to extend the terms of their guaranteed loans. The SBA could
choose to interpret the regulations conservatively by treating short-term
renewal applications as if they were original applications for medium-
term guarantees. Thus, in addition to the fee of one quarter percent ini-
tially assessed on the short-term loan, the agency could charge a two-
percent guaranty fee for the renewal.
The SBA must have received complaints about this possible inter-
pretation because the proposed guidelines provide that approvals for loan
renewals with original maturities of 12 months or less, would only be
charged an additional one quarter-percent guaranty renewal fee.99 A
two-percent fee will in turn be charged for renewals on medium-term
guarantees.1"° However, the guidelines still do not take into account the
fact that exporters who originally applied for repayment terms in excess
of one year still run the risk of having to pay an additional two-percent
fee, even if the renewal request is to cover a very short period of time.
Eximbank's fee structure has also been criticized by small exporters
as being too expensive. °10 Eximbank charges a processing fee, a facility
fee, and a usage fee. The processing fee of $100 is charged by the Bank to
review the guarantee application. The facility fee, which is similar to the
SBA's guaranty fee, is chargeable to the lender, and amounts to one-half
of one percent of the loan amount. Finally, the usage fee, which is simi-
lar to the SBA's commitment fee, is one-quarter of one percent on the
outstanding balance of the loan, notwithstanding the loan repayment
term. 102
I. Exporter Reporting Requirements
The SBA regulations require that exporters submit monthly pro-
gress reports to the lender during the term of the loan and projected cash
flow charts along with their application to the SBA.103 The Eximbank
guidelines request more information from exporters during the applica-
tion process. Exporters must submit financial statements covering the
past three years and projected financial statements covering the proposed
loan period under the WCG Program. 1"
99 SBA User's Guide, supra note 63, at 5.
100 Id.
101 Pilot Projects, supra note 88, at 27.
102 1990 Eximbank User's Guide, supra note 67, at 111-6.
103 13 C.F.R. Sec. 122.54-6(a), (b) (1989).
104 1990 Eximbank User's Guide, supra note 67, at II-11.
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V. WHICH PROGRAM IS THE LEAST EXPENSIVE FOR SMALL
BusINESS EXPORTERS?
As the above discussion indicates, an exporter will be faced with a
conflicting array of fees and costs when it comes to deciding whether or
not to apply for an ERLC or WCG Program guarantee. A hypothetical
case can be used to illustrate the exporter's dilemma. Imagine that a
company needs a short-term loan for $400,000 to purchase raw materials
to be used to produce paper products for export to a foreign buyer. The
company would be charged the following fees and rates under both
programs:
SBA Eximbank
Processing Fee 0 $100
Guaranty Fee (or Facility Fee):
for < 1 year repayment term $1,000 $2,000
for > 1 year repayment term $8,000 (no limit on
repayment terms)
Commitment Fee (or Usage Fee) $1,000 $1,000
Interest Prime + 2 1/4% No interest cap
As the above indicates, the exporter's costs will be based largely on
the type of repayment terms that it needs. Since this exporter needs
short-term financing, it will probably find the SBA program will proba-
bly seem more attractive because of the lower $1000 guaranty fee. How-
ever, for a company that needs medium-term financing, the choice is
more complicated. Initially, this company will probably find the $2,000
Eximbank facility fee more appealing since the SBA will charge $8,000
for the same repayment terms. However, the same exporter could face
higher interest rate charges under the Eximbank Program since Ex-
imbank places no limits on the amount of interest that commercial banks
can charge.
Even if the fees under both programs were the same, exporters still
have to find a commercial bank to give them a loan. While the WCG
Program may be appealing to banks because Eximbank provides a
ninety-percent guarantee of principal and places no restrictions on inter-
est rate charges, commercial lenders will probably be unhappy with the
interest rate coverage Eximbank offers, i.e., only Treasury plus one per-
cent. On the other hand, while the SBA guarantees interest rate charges
up to prime plus two and one-quarter percent, the SBA will only guaran-
tee eighty-five percent of principal amount of the loan. Thus, there are
no clear cut rules for determining which program is best suited for small
exporters.
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VI. TRACK RECORD OF PROGRAMS
In addition to the confusion over program costs, there has also been
criticism from the banking and small-business communities about the
performance records of both the WCG and ERLC Programs. This criti-
cism has been influenced by a variety of factors, including: (1) federal
budget cuts that have severely interfered with Eximbank staffing levels
and caused overall program delivery to suffer; (2) the SBA staff's lack of
the requisite international trade experience; and (3) the displeasure of
exporters and bankers with the relatively high level of collateral coverage
required by both agencies.
A. Eximbank Track Record
The WCG Program got off to a very slow start when it was first
established in 1983. During the first seven months that the program was
in existence, the Bank received a total of 42 applications, but approved
only 17. Despite later efforts to clarify program application require-
ments, the Bank approved only one WCG application in 1984, one in
1985 and one in 1986.105 The Bank justified these low approval rates by
explaining that many of the applications it received were either not well
defined or were poor credit risks. It also complained to Congress that it
did not have adequate resources to market the program effectively.
10 6
Critics, however, have charged that the low authorization rates were the
result of a clear bias on Eximbank's part against small exporters.
10 7
In 1988, however, Eximbank saw a drastic increase in exporter use
of the WCG Program. The total amount of guarantees authorized that
year was $75.5 million. Even though exporter use of the WCG Program
has steadily increased over the last few years, 108 the perception remains
that Eximbank discriminates against small-business exports. Some banks
believe that Eximbank's documentation is too complicated. Others say
that Eximbank's policy of taking a first lien position sours commercial
bank interest in the program0 9 . Small exporters in turn complain that
105 These figures are listed in a summary of WCG Program activity, dated 9/24/90, that was
obtained as a result of the author's Freedom of Information Act request.
106 Draper, supra note 68, at 5.
107 Financing Of Small Business Exports by the Export-Import Bank- Hearing before the Sub-
comm. on Export Promotion and Market Development of the Senate Comm. On Small Business, 98th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 24 (1984) (statement of Senator Rudy Boschwitz).
108 By 1990 the total amount authorized under the program had risen to $88.6 million. (See 1990
Annual Report, supra note 67, at 15.)
109 Banks still retain a 10% unguaranteed risk in the pre-export loan and thus believe that they
should be able to liquidate any collateral before Eximbank gets a chance to do so. See Pilot Projects,
supra note 88, at 31.
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Eximbank's poor turnaround time in processing applications11° causes
companies to lose bids on foreign contracts.
It is too simplistic, however, to accuse Eximbank staff of harboring
purely discriminatory motives when they process guarantee applications.
It is more likely that budgetary problems have had the greatest impact on
the way in which the WCG Program has been administered in more re-
cent years. Specifically, even though the Bank experienced a thirty-eight
percent increase in the amount of loan and guarantee applications it re-
ceived in 1988, Congress did not approve a corresponding increase in the
Bank's administrative budget to hire new employees. This has forced the
Bank to make its already small staff responsible for an even wider range
of responsibilities. 1I This in turn has caused the "banking community's
lack of confidence in Eximbank's responsiveness; [and] lack of knowledge
by emerging businesses of Eximbank's programs.'
' 112
B. SBA Track Record
Like Eximbank, the SBA also had great difficulty launching the
ERLC Program in its early years. In 1983, the total amount of loans
guaranteed under the program was $7.6 million. 13 Although Eximbank
was able to significantly increase exporter use of its program in the ensu-
ing years, the SBA has not been so successful. In 1989, nine years after
the ERLC Program was created, the amount of SBA guarantees ap-
proved reached its peak at $10.3 million. But in 1990, the total author-
ized amount fell to $5 million."1
4
A study commissioned by the SBA in 1989 to evaluate the ERLC
Program listed three main reasons for the program's poor track record:
(1) lack of sufficient international trade experience on the part of SBA
staff,15 (2) poor marketing of the program to bankers, 1 6 and (3) insuffi-
cient guaranteed risk coverage on bank loans (i.e., that the eighty-five
guarantee coverage is too low).
117
Congress did not adequately anticipate just how hard-pressed the
SBA would be to implement a large scale international trade program
110 Pilot Projects, supra note 88, at 6.
111 Future of the Export-Import Bank Direct Lending ProgramrrHearing Before the Subcomm. On
International Development, Finance, Trade and Monetary Policy of the House Comm. On Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1989).
112 Pilot Projects, supra note 88, at 6.
113 SBA Financings, supra note 9, at 2.
114 Id.
115 ERLC Review, supra note 64, at 17.
116 Id. at 32.
117 Id. at 12.
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when the Small Business Expansion Act was passed in 1980. It is thus
understandable that a domestically-oriented SBA initially floundered
when it first tried to administer the ERLC Program. The SBA is now
trying to remedy this situation by sending its finance staff to export fi-
nance training sessions.11 Whether or not these efforts will be successful
will likely not be known for some time.
Marketing the ERLC Program to bankers has posed its own set of
problems. The SBA study concluded that marketing problems were
partly due to the organizational structure of commercial banks. Since
the SBA has had longstanding relationships with the domestic lending
departments of most banks, the international departments of these banks
were never contacted by the SBA's staff. Unfortunately, it is the interna-
tional commercial bank staff that has the necessary expertise to deal with
the types of transactions covered by the ERLC Program. 119
As the above discussion indicates, budgetary problems and lack of
international expertise has had a drastic effect on how successfully the
ERLC and WCG Programs have been administered. Eximbank has
marketed its program well, but its staffing has been inadequate to compe-
tently perform the followup necessary to implement the program. More-
over, the SBA's lack of sufficient international trade expertise has left it
falling well short of reaching the ERLC Program's potential.
In light of the above, the business public has become extremely cyni-
cal about both government programs. As one small exporter so aptly
explained "the inexperience and poor expertise of most financial institu-
tions, bankers, and government agencies, which usually encourage your
cooperation, only let you down when the real opportunity arises. It
seems they are most interested in filling in their PR to the chagrin of the
exporter". 120
VII. MEASURES TO STREAMLINE BOTH PROGRAMS
In view of the above evaluation, it is clear that changes need to be
made in both programs if there is any hope that the government will be
able to support small exporters in the manner envisioned by Congress in
the early 1980's. There are two possible alternatives that Congress could
take to achieve this result. One alternative would require both agencies to
adopt the same coverage and program terms. The other alternative
would require that both programs be combined and administered by one
agency instead of two.
118 Obstacles to Export Hearings, supra note 3, at 92.
119 Burton Associates, ERLC Review, supra note 64, at 17.
120 Mahone, supra note 5, at 33.
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A. Alternative # 1: Uniform Coverage and Program Terms
To carry out this alternative, Congress should enact legislation that
requires both agencies to charge the same fees and provide the same level
of guarantee coverage. If this alternative were implemented, exporter
confusion over conflicting program terms and fees would be eliminated.
Furthermore, guarantee coverage should be raised to the highest possible
levels so that banks and exporters have a greater incentive to use these
programs. A uniform guarantee coverage and fee structure might look
like the following:
Processing Fee 0
Guaranty Fees (no limit on the $2,000
repayment term)
Commitment Fees (or Usage Fee) $1,000
Interest Covered Prime + 2 1/4%
Guaranteed Amount 95% (of $750,000 for the SBA and 95%
of the collateral value for Eximbank)
In the above case, Eximbank's application fee and the two tier SBA
guaranty fee have been dropped. The SBA's eighty-five percent guaran-
tee coverage and Eximbank's ninety percent coverage have been in-
creased to ninety-five percent. Commercial banks would be limited to
charging the SBA-stipulated rate of prime plus two and one-quarter per-
cent. However, in order to counter bank displeasure with the rate re-
striction, it is suggested that both agencies allow commercial banks to
take a first lien position on their fifteen percent unguaranteed loan
amounts. However, unless Congress is willing to clearly admit that the
government should finance uncreditworthy pre-export transactions, it is
important that both agencies be allowed to continue to use discretion in
asking for personal guarantees and additional security when necessary.
Finally, the SBA's staff should continue to get the necessary training to
further develop their international trade skills.
B. Alternative #2 - A Pre-Export Program Administered
By One Agency
This alternative could prove to be the more effective of the two, but
would probably be more difficult to implement. In this case, the pro-
grams would be combined and administered by one agency. It is clear
that Eximbank's staff has the greatest amount of training in the field of
international trade finance. In contrast to the SBA, Eximbank also has
more extensive contacts in the international commercial banking com-
munity. However, because of budgetary constraints, Eximbank staffing
levels are too low to accommodate exporter needs under the WCG Pro-
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gram. Thus, Eximbank should serve as the chief administrator of the
combined guarantee program, and the SBA's regional offices could pro-
vide brokerage services for Eximbank.
Under this arrangement, Eximbank would delegate authority to the
SBA to guarantee pre-export loans on Eximbank's behalf, subject to cer-
tain clearly delineated criteria set forth by Eximbank in an agreement
with the SBA. The SBA's staff would be required to attend Eximbank
training sessions to learn about program guidelines. Exporters would be
able to apply for loan amounts which exceed the SBA $750,000 limit.
Guarantee and commitment fees, and the principal and interest rate cov-
erage recommended in Alternative #1 would also be adopted. Thus,
lenders and exporters would no longer be confronted with two conflicting
programs designed to serve the same purpose.
This alternative would harness Eximbank's international expertise
and solve its staffing problems at the same time. It would also take ad-
vantage of the SBA's regional offices, which have access to exporters at
the local level. Similar arrangements have already been made by Ex-
imbank to delegate authority to certain commercial banks to make guar-
anteed loans under the WCG Program.121
Eximbank and the SBA have made joint efforts in the past with re-
spect to the ERLC and WCG Programs. Since Eximbank and the SBA
are directed by law to cooperate in the promotion of small-business ex-
ports, 122 the two agencies signed a co-guaranty agreement in 1984 for the
purpose of serving small exporters more efficiently and effectively.
Under the arrangement, both agencies agreed to guaranty on a fifty-fifty
basis ninety percent of pre-export loans to small companies for loan
amounts up to $1 million. Fees and other program terms were to be the
same as the SBA's ERLC Program fees and terms. The SBA also agreed
to administer the co-guaranty program through its regional offices.
123
However, to date there has been virtually no use of this program by small
exporters. 124
In order to ensure that alternative #2 has greater success than the
121 Eximbank allows certain commercial banks to issue guarantees on Eximbank's behalf to cover
up to $300,000 without Eximbank's prior approval, subject to specific guidelines and requirements
set forth in an agreement between the lender and Eximbank. See 1990 Eximbank User's Guide, supra
note 67, at 111-8.
122 15 U.S.C.A. Sec.635(2)(b)(1)(E)(viii).
123 See Memorandum of Understanding Between The Small Business Administration and The Ex-
port-Import Bank of the United States,1-1l (August 30, 1984).
124 Interview with Eximbank marketing staff member (January 21, 1992). There is little docu-
mented evidence to suggest what the reasons are for the lack of exporter use of this program, but
exporters and banks probably have similar negative reactions to this program as they do to the
SBA's ERLC program. Lack of exporter interest in this co-guaranty program is also probably due to
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aforementioned co-guaranty program, stronger legislation mandating the
creation of a combined program, as opposed to directing "cooperation",
would have to be enacted. Of course, any legislation of this type would
also have to be accompanied by a corresponding increase in Eximbank's
guaranty authority, and Eximbank's administrative budget would have
to be raised to take into account the increased costs associated with im-
plementing such a program.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The above proposals are not meant to be rigidly implemented. They
are intended instead to serve as a catalyst for dialogue between the small
business community, Congress, Eximbank and the SBA. As the U.S.
continues to experience the debilitating effects of the recession, measures
that increase support for the small business community must be seriously
considered. Hopefully, such measures will create government programs
that more effectively serve the needs of the small business community
and, ultimately, the U.S. economy.
the fact that exporters prefer to go directly to Eximbank when they need guarantees for loans that
are higher than the $750,000 SBA loan limit.
